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Abstract: This paper reviewed the theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship
between ownership structure and dividends. Agency theory suggested that dividend was served
to reduce agency problems between owners (or large controlling shareholders) and managers
(or minority shareholders) by reducing the amount of free cash flow and increasing monitoring
by external parties. It also proposed that ownership concentration and composition might
mitigate or exacerbate agency problems. We might expect substitutability or complementary
relationship existed between dividend and ownership concentration/composition. Empirical
evidence showed that the relationship between dividend and managerial or large shareholdings
could be negative (i.e., consistent with substitute argument), positive (i.e., consistent with
complementary argument) or non-linear (i.e., consistent with entrenchment hypothesis). In
addition, the literature suggested that family controlled firms might expropriate minority
shareholders by paying lower dividends or mitigate moral hazard conflicts by distributing
more cash. Empirical research on this issue, however, provided mixed findings.
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There are numerous definitions of corporate
governance proposed by financial economists. These
definitions generally refer to the existence of
conflicts of interest between insiders (e.g., managers
or controlling shareholder) and outsiders (e.g.,
dispersed shareholders or minority shareholders)
arising from the separation of ownership and
control in modern corporations. Such corporate
governance problems cannot be effectively resolved
by complete contracting due to the significant
uncertainties, information asymmetries and
contracting costs in the relationship between capital
providers and insiders. Therefore, some mechanisms
are needed to control moral hazard problems, such
as the threat of takeover, the managerial labour
market, large shareholders (i.e., external
mechanisms), boards of directors, insider ownership,
compensation packages, debt and dividends (i.e.,
internal mechanisms).
There is a growing interest in understanding
the interaction between dividend decisions and the
governance of corporations. The important role that
dividend policy can play in corporate governance is
derived basically from agency theory. In particular,
dividends can assist dispersed (or minority)
shareholders in monitoring managers (or large
controlling shareholders). Dividends serve to reduce
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agency problems between owners (or large
controlling shareholders) and managers (or minority
shareholders) by reducing the amount of free cash
flow (Jensen, 1986; La Porta et al., 2000) and forcing
insiders to raise funds in the capital markets more
frequently, thus subjecting insiders to outside
scrutiny (Easterbrook, 1984; Rozeff, 1982).
THE MONITORING ROLE
OF DIVIDENDS
Insider Ownership and Dividend Policy
The finance literature suggests that dividends
may help reduce agency problems. The seminal
studies of Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook (1984)
provide agency cost explanations of why firms pay
dividends. In particular, Rozeff suggests that
dividend payments are part of the firm’s optimal
monitoring mechanism and these payments help
to reduce agency costs. In his model, firms choose a
dividend payout ratio that minimises their total costs
(i.e., agency costs and transaction costs of financing).
Agency costs decrease with dividends, while
transaction costs increase with dividends. The
minimisation of total costs results in a unique
optimal dividend payout for a given firm.
Meanwhile, Easterbrook argues that dividend
payments force managers to raise funds in the
capital markets more frequently than they would
without dividend payments. Therefore dividends
cause managers to be frequently scrutinised by
external professionals such as investment bankers,
lawyers and public accountants. This in turn forces
managers to act in line with shareholders’ interests,
thereby reducing agency costs of equity.
Easterbrook also suggests that substitution exists
among agency-cost control mechanisms. In
particular, Easterbrook states “Because all forms of
controlling agency costs are themselves costly, we
would expect to see substitution among agency-
cost control devices” (p.657).
Another argument based on agency costs
explanation for dividends is suggested by Jensen
(1986). Like Easterbrook (1984), Jensen argues that
managers cannot be perfectly monitored and may
choose to maximise their utility rather than
maximise shareholders’ interests. Jensen also
suggests that cash is the asset that managers can
misuse most easily. Therefore, any funds remaining
after financing all positive net present value (NPV)
projects (i.e., “free cash flows”) may cause a conflict
of interest between managers and shareholders.
Jensen’s analysis implies that dividend payments
benefit outside shareholders because they serve to
reduce free cash flows from manager control.
Another way to reduce the amount of free cash
flows under management control is by increasing
debt, which requires an increase in routine interest
payments. Dividend and debt interest payments
thus may control agency costs by decreasing the
free cash flow available to managers to invest in
marginal or negative NPV projects and manager
perquisite consumption.
There has been a substantial number of
empirical studies that lend support for the agency
costs explanation of dividends.  For example, Rozeff
(1982), Crutchley and Hansen (1989), Moh’d, Perry
and Rimbey (1995); Crutchley et al. (1999), Chen and
Steiner (1999) and Short et al. (2002) examine the
relationship between dividends and managerial or
insider ownership. They find that firms establish a
higher (lower) dividend payout ratio when
managers or insiders hold a lower (higher) fraction
of the equity, which is consistent with the agency
costs explanation for dividends. That is, dividends
are less important in reducing agency problems
when managers have large equity holdings, aligning
their interests better with outside shareholders. In
addition, Rozeff (1982) also finds that firms with
higher firm-specific risks and high growth firms pay
smaller dividends, which is consistent with his model.
Rozeff’s model also receives support from Dempsey
and Laber (1992) who replicated Rozeff’s analysis
using samples from different periods of time and
KEUANGAN
78 JURNAL KEUANGAN DAN PERBANKAN
Vol. 12, No. 1, Januari 2008: 76 – 83
from Crutchley and Hansen (1989) who find that
dividends are negatively related to the firm’s
flotation costs. Meanwhile, Jensen et al. (1992) and
Noronha et al. (1996) find that insider ownership,
dividends and debt financing are substitute
mechanisms in controlling agency costs which is
consistent with Easterbrook’s (1984) argument.
Finally, Agrawal and Jayaraman (1984) report that
dividend payout ratios of all-equity firms are
significantly higher than those of leveraged firms,
which suggests that dividends reduce free cash flow
problems and thus supports Jensen’s (1986)
hypothesis.
There is, however, evidence that insider
shareholdings are positively related to dividends.
Specifically, Fenn and Liang (2001) suggest that
when the interests of managers and shareholders
are less aligned, managers will tend to over invest
rather than return free cash flows to shareholders.
Thus, insider shareholdings are positively related to
dividends, and Fenn and Liang’ results support this
hypothesis for the subset of firms with the highest
degree of agency costs.
Moreover, a few studies (e.g., Farinha, 2003;
Schooley and Barney, 1994) attempt to examine
whether the relationship between dividends and
managerial shareholdings is non-monotonic.
Schooley and Barney extend Rozeff’s (1982) model,
and suggest a non-monotonic relation between
dividend payout ratio and managerial
shareholdings. The authors argue that this non-
monotonic relationship is consistent with the
monitoring rationale for dividends and the
managerial entrenchment hypothesis (Morck et al.,
1988; Short and Keasey, 1999). In particular, when
managerial shareholdings are low, an increase in
ownership equity tends to reduce agency costs. As
agency costs decrease, dividends tend to decrease
because dividends become less important as a tool
used for mitigating agency costs. At higher levels
of managerial shareholdings (where managers are
entrenched), agency costs tend to increase with an
increase in the ownership percentage. As a result,
increased monitoring via higher dividends becomes
more necessary. A U-shaped relationship between
dividends and managerial ownership is also
reported by Farinha (2003) who examine a sample
of U.K. firms.
Large Shareholders and Dividend Policy
The relationship between large shareholders
and dividends stems from Easterbrook’s (1984)
argument, which suggests that a negative
relationship exists between large shareholders and
dividends. In particular, firms that have large
shareholders, especially when these shareholders
participate in the management of their firms, have
less need for monitoring by outside professionals.
As suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and
Fama and Jensen (1983), when ownership and
control are separated, firm’s decisions are the result
of the relative power of investors and corporate
insiders, whose interests may not coincide. When
ownership is concentrated, large shareholders have
powerful incentives to monitor and control
managers. Accordingly, closely-held firms tend to
have lower dividend payouts than identical firms
that are more prone to manager-owner agency
conflicts.
Concentrated voting power, however, gives
large shareholders the ability to influence the
strategic decisions of the firm, including dividend
policy. As large shareholders’ preferences for
dividends may be affected by several factors such
as tax and monitoring motive, this may cause the
relationship between dividends and large
shareholders to be less predictable. For example,
large shareholders may choose a policy to pay higher
dividends so that managers can be monitored by
appropriate parties or a policy to pay lower
dividends if this is consistent with their tax
preferences. Eckbo and Verma (1994) suggest that
due to different shareholder tax rates, information
asymmetries and agency costs, shareholders may
have disagreement over dividend policy.
Accordingly, dividend policies reflect a compromise
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solution where the interests of various
heterogenous shareholder groups are represented
by the group’s voting power.
Alternatively, a positive relationship between
large shareholders and dividends is suggested by
Shleifer and Vishny (1986). In their model, dividends
serve as a side payment to large shareholders, such
as institutional or corporate investors (who, in the
U.S., have a tax preference for higher dividends),
to entice them to hold their shares and to monitor
managers.
Mixed findings, however, are prevalent in
research into the impact of large shareholders on
dividend policy. In particular, Zeckhauser and Pound
(1990) examine the dividend payout ratio for firms
with and without large shareholders (i.e., a single
outside shareholder owning more than 15 per cent
of equity) using a sample of 286 U.S. firms. They
find that the presence or absence of large
shareholders seems to make no significant
difference in payout ratios across opaque industries
(those that are difficult to monitor such as
aerospace, computers, drugs, etc.) or transparent
industries (those that are easy to monitor such as
apparel, petroleum, publishing, etc.). The result does
not support the notion that large shareholders and
dividend payouts are alternative forms of
monitoring. Short et al. (2002) investigated the
impact of institutional ownership and managerial
shareholdings on dividend policy on a sample of
UK firms. They found that high institutional
ownership leads to dividend increases, while high
managerial ownership reduces dividend payouts.
The authors argue that institutional investors
control agency problems not directly by monitoring
managers, but by forcing management to raise
external funds more frequently which subjects them
to the scrutiny of capital markets.
Despite the obvious benefit of monitoring,
the presence of large shareholders can have a
negative impact. Large shareholders who own
sufficient voting rights to control firms (i.e.,
controlling shareholders) may represent their own
interests, which need not coincide with the interests
of other shareholders (i.e., minority shareholders).
La Porta et al. (2000) suggest that dividend payments
are an ideal device for limiting minority shareholder
wealth expropriation because they guarantee a pro-
rata payout for all shareholders and remove
corporate wealth from controlling shareholders. The
authors hypothesis a relationship between dividend
policies and the level of legal investor protection in
one of the following two ways: dividends are the
outcome of an effective system of legal protection
where minority shareholders use their legal powers
to force controlling shareholders to pay dividends
(the outcome model), or dividends are a substitute
for legal protection that relies on the firm’s need to
raise external financing.  In other words, firms that
need to raise external financing are not able to sell
securities without providing routine dividend
payments (the substitute model).
Under a strong legal protection system,
minority shareholders use their legal power to force
controlling blockholders to distribute more cash,
thus preventing insiders from expropriating
company earnings. For example, shareholders might
vote for directors who offer better dividend policies
and sell shares to potential hostile raiders who then
obtain control over non-dividend paying companies
(La Porta et al., 2000). The system also makes rent
extraction such as asset diversion legally riskier and
more expensive for insiders, thus raising the relative
attraction of dividends. The outcome model thereby
predicts that dividend payout ratios are higher in
countries with good shareholder protection. On the
other hand, the substitute model predicts the
opposite. In addition, the outcome model further
predicts that in countries with good shareholder
protection, companies with better investment
opportunities should have lower dividend payout
ratios, whereas the substitute model does not make
this prediction. The authors empirically examine a
sample of 33 countries with different levels of
minority shareholder rights and found supporting
evidence for the outcome model.
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Family Control and Dividend Policy
Agency theory provides mixed predictions
about the dividend behaviour of family controlled
firms. Families potentially reduce owner-manager
agency problems through better monitoring of
managers or direct involvement in management.
Gugler (2003) argues that neither major conflicts
of interest nor large asymmetries of information
between management and ultimate owners are
present in family- firms. This reflects the fact that
managers and large family shareholders are often
the same persons, or that large family shareholders
have enough incentive and power for efficient
direct monitoring.  As a result, agency theory
prescriptions regarding monitoring can be
redundant in family firms (Randøy and Goel, 2003).
Dividends and/or dividend stability in family firms
can therefore be less valuable (as tools to reduce
agency costs), and owner-managers are likely to cut
dividends when necessary. In contrast, several recent
studies (e.g., Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001; Steier, 2003)
suggest that agency problems in family firms can
be more severe than previously believed, suggesting
that dividends can play a significant role in
controlling agency costs in family firms.
In addition, it is widely held that controlling
families have strong incentives to expropriate
wealth from minority shareholders, especially when
their control exceeds their ownership rights
(Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio et al., 2001; Shleifer
and Vishny, 1997). Families are also keen to maintain
control of their firms to protect their highly valuable
private benefits of control. These arguments
(referred to as the expropriation argument) predict
that families prefer a lower dividend payout policy
to preserve cash flows that they can potentially
expropriate, or to maintain control. Alternatively,
La Porta et al. (2000) argue that under a strong legal
protection system, minority shareholders use their
legal power to force controlling blockholders to
distribute more cash. The system also makes rent
extraction, such as asset diversion, legally more risky
and more expensive for insiders, thus raising the
relative attraction of dividends. This argument
thereby predicts that under a strong legal protection
system, minority shareholders will force families to
pay (higher) dividends.
Despite extensive evidence relating to
dividend policy and ownership structure, both in
the US and internationally, surprisingly little is
known about the interaction between family
control and dividend policy. A small number of
studies which have examined the dividend policy
of family controlled firms in Western Europe have
produced mixed results. Gugler (2003) found that
firms controlled by families in Austria do not engage
in dividend smoothing, choose lower target payout
levels, and are less reluctant to cut dividends than
those controlled by the state, banks, and foreigners.
However, since the ownership structure in Austria
is extremely concentrated, Gugler analyses only
closely-held firms. In contrast, Silva et al. (2004, p.
140) report that, in Germany, family control does
not seem to have a significant impact on dividend
policy. Chen et al. (2005) also find little relationship
between family ownership and dividend policy in a
sample of listed Hong Kong firms.
Evidence from the U.S. has been provided by
Villalonga and Amit (2006), who, using a sample of
Fortune 500 firms, primarily observe the value of
family firms. The univariate tests in their study reveal
that family firms have significantly lower dividend
rates than non-family firms, which is consistent with
the argument that owner-manager conflicts are
lower in family firms. This finding, however, should
be interpreted cautiously as the researchers do not
control for other variables that may affect dividends
such as firm size, growth opportunity and risk.
Important evidence on the link between
expropriation by large shareholders and dividends
is provided by two studies: Faccio et al. (2001) and
Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003). Faccio et al. (2001)
found that group-affiliated corporations in Western
Europe (about half of them are family controlled),
pay significantly higher dividends than those in East
Asia. This result implies that dividends dampen rent
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extraction in Western Europe, but exacerbate it in
East Asia. The authors particularly examine two
arguments in relation to dividends and
expropriation. The first is that a corporation with
lower ownership and control rights ratios will pay
lower dividends since the controlling shareholders
seek to keep control of the firm’s resources.
Alternatively, in corporations with lower ownership
and control rights ratios, controlling shareholders
could refrain from expropriation by committing to
higher dividend payouts, thus sustaining their firm’s
stock market valuation and future access to capital.
Faccio et al. suggest that the trade-off between the
above arguments depends on how tightly a
corporation is controlled and empirically find that
when investors strongly anticipate that
expropriation will occur within a corporation with
higher incentives to extract rent, higher dividends
will be paid as the firm competes for capital.
In addition, Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003)
examine whether the rent extraction hypothesis has
implications for the level of dividends being paid in
Germany. They find that larger holdings of the
largest shareholders are associated with reduced
dividends, whereas the larger holdings of the second
largest shareholders increase dividend payouts. This
suggests that the presence of other large
shareholders in the firm helps to reduce rent
extraction by controlling shareholders.
CONCLUSION
The relationship between ownership
structure and dividends stems from agency theory.
In particular, it suggests that dividends serve to
reduce agency problems between owners (or large
controlling shareholders) and managers (or minority
shareholders) by reducing the amount of free cash
flow and increasing monitoring by external parties.
It also proposes that ownership concentration and
composition may mitigate or exacerbate agency
problems. As such, substitutability or
complementary relationship between dividends and
ownership concentration/composition can be
expected. Empirical evidence shows that the
relationship between dividends and managerial or
large shareholdings can be negative (i.e., consistent
with substitute argument), positive (i.e., consistent
with complementary argument) or non-linear (i.e.,
consistent with entrenchment hypothesis).
Moreover, agency theorists argue that family
controlled firms may pay lower dividends preserve
cash which can be expropriated or pay higher
dividends to mitigate moral hazard conflicts with
minority shareholders. Empirical evidence on this
issue, however, is inconclusive.
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